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Introduction 
In a typical two-alternative forced-choice task of inference 
from memory, two objects are presented on a computer 
screen, which act as the alternatives among which a subject 
has to choose. Models of inference describe how attributes 
of those objects are used as cues to infer which of the two 
objects scores higher on a criterion of interest. Many 
models of inference have focused on describing not just 
what the outcome of this inference would be, but also which 
processing steps a decision maker would transverse to reach 
a decision. These models have increased substantially our 
understanding of the inferential process we follow (e.g., 
Bröder, 2012) and why this process is successful 
(Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009).  
However, some scientific question on inference from 
memory remain unanswered, because many models are 
frequently underspecified compared to the data that they are 
tested against. Cognitive mechanisms that remain 
underspecified include perception, motor action or a 
detailed memory theory. We argue that specifying all 
cognitive processes will help those models make precise 
predictions and address currently unaddressable questions.  
The aim of this paper is to implement existing models of 
inference in the cognitive architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 
2007), thus creating a database of publicly available 
architectural process models of decision making. We 
proceed with a brief description the classes of models that 
we include. 
Models included in the database 
Inferential models can be dichotomized, based on the type 
of information they rely upon, into availability-based and 
cue-based models. Following Newell and Bröder (2008), we 
further divide cue-based models into rule-based cue 
abstraction models, evidence accumulation cue abstraction 
models and configural models.  
Availability-based decision models 
We have included two availability-based models in our 
database: the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002) and the fluency heuristic (Schooler & Herwtig, 2005). 
ACT-R implementations of availability-based models 
already exist (e.g., Marewski & Mehlhorn, 2011). However, 
we have included those for completeness. To make 
inferences, both of these models require only declarative 
chunks that represent the decision alternatives. 
A Knowledge-based decision model 
As a starting point, we include a general cue-based 
mechanism, which checks whether there is any knowledge 
present for the alternatives beyond availability and, if there 
is such knowledge for one alternative only, it selects that 
alternative (see Fechner et al., 2016). 
Rule-based cue abstraction models 
Cue-abstraction models operate on individual cues. These 
models retrieve cues one by one and make a decision when 
a decision rule is met. Among these models, we include 
fast-and-frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC 
Research Group, 1999), like take-the-best (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996), ∆-inference (Luan, Schooler, & 
Gigerenzer, 2014) and take-the-last (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1999). We have also included more complex 
models, like the weighted-linear model (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). Some cue-abstraction models have 
already been implemented in ACT-R (e.g., Dimov, 
Marewski, & Schooler, 2013). All of these models require 
declarative chunks that store cue values of alternatives. 
Evidence accumulation cue-abstraction models 
Just like rule-based models, evidence accumulation models 
(Lee & Cummins, 2004) retrieve cues sequentially and 
require declarative chunks that store cue values. Unlike rule-
based models, evidence accumulation models make a 
decision when enough evidence is accumulated in favor of 
one alternative or the other. We have implemented several 
such models, which differ in how they weigh cue values.   
Configural models 
Unlike cue-abstraction models, which require a separate 
chunk for each cue, configural models work on a set of cues. 
For example, exemplar models (e.g., Nosofsky, 1984) 
compare the cue profiles of alternatives (i.e., the set of cues 
associated with an alternative) to similar cue profile in 
memory and make inferences based on those profiles. We 
implement three different exemplar models. The first model 
evaluates each alternative based on a single similar 
exemplar, the second based on a weighted average of all 
exemplars in memory, while the third model considers 
fluency information. In addition, we include two prototype 
models, which differ in whether they evaluate the alternative 
based on a set of rules working on the entire cue profile (see 
Johansen & Kruschke, 2005) or based on fluency 
information.  
In addition, we consider configural models which work 
with cue-profile pairs. These models are instance-based 
learning theory (Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003) and 
parallel constraint satisfaction (Glöckner & Betsch 2008). 
In analogy to the exemplar implementations, we have 
created two instance-based learning models: the first 
retrieves the most similar cue-profile pair, while the second 
retrieves a weighted average of cue-profile pairs from 
memory. 
Discussion and conclusion 
We have provided a database of ACT-R implementations of 
models of inference from memory. These implementations 
provide comparable predictions, which can serve as a basis 
for model tests. Specifically, this database can be used, first, 
in model comparison simulations and, second, it can be 
utilized in future studies to identify decision processes using 
both behavioral and neural data. We expect that this will 
speed up addressing the currently present theoretical issues. 
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